Pain is a paradigmatic mental state. According to Hilary Putnam (1967: 37), all main fields of the philosophy of mind can be related to pain. Therefore, understanding the nature of pain may reveal properties of the mental in general, and an inquiry concerning the methods of pain research may enlighten the science of consciousness as a whole, as Güzeldere and Ayede (2002) suggested.

The aim of the project is twofold. First, I will argue that the everyday concept of pain is fundamentally cluttered: The diversity of pathological pain phenomena suggests that „pain“ has the properties of a family resemblance. This weakens the claim for reducing pain, and thereby mental concepts in general. However, this does not rule out a science of pain in general: Taking Carnap‘s idea of explication, the family resemblence properties of „pain“ pose no threat.

If one focuses on the explication process of „pain“, two methods have helped to fragment the everyday notion of „pain“ into scientifically helpful concepts: Neuroscience, especially lesion studies in humans, and phenomenological reports (e.g. Grahek 2007). To analyze the interaction of phenomenological reports and neuroscience in building theories on pain is the second and main part of the project. If a successfull model is found for pain, it might serve as a general foundation for the research of phenomenality.

Ayede, Murat and Güzeldere, Güven (2002): Some foundational problems in the scientific study of pain. In: Philosophy of Science, 69, pp. S265-S283.

Carnap, Rudolf (1959): Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Wien: Springer.

Carnap, Rudolf (1998): Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

Grahek, Nikola (2007): Feeling pain and being in pain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Putnam, Hilary (1967): Psychological Predicates. In: W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (eds): Art, Mind and Religion, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 37-48.